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Abstract— Surveillance-Evasion (SE) games form an impor-
tant class of adversarial trajectory-planning problems. We con-
sider time-dependent SE games, in which an Evader is trying
to reach its target while minimizing the cumulative exposure
to a moving enemy Observer. That Observer is simultaneously
aiming to maximize the same exposure by choosing how often
to use each of its predefined patrol trajectories. Following the
framework introduced in [1], we develop efficient algorithms
for finding Nash Equilibrium policies for both players by
blending techniques from semi-infinite game theory, convex
optimization, and multi-objective dynamic programming on
continuous planning spaces. We illustrate our method on several
examples with Observers using omnidirectional and angle-
restricted sensors on a domain with occluding obstacles.
I. INTRODUCTION
While optimal trajectory-planning is a common task in
robotics, the notion of “optimality” can be based on many
different criteria, such as minimizing time taken to reach
the destination, energy required to traverse the path, or
minimizing exposure to some sort of threat. In this paper,
we focus on the latter in the context of Surveillance-Evasion
(SE) games.
We model this adversarial trajectory-planning problem as
a semi-infinite zero-sum game between two robotic players:
an Observer (O) and an Evader (E) traveling through a
domain with occluding obstacles. O chooses a probability
distribution over a finite set of predefined surveillance plans.
E chooses a probability distribution over an infinite set
of trajectories that bring it to a target location before a
specified deadline. O’s position and orientation define a time-
dependent pointwise observability function. E’s goal is to
minimize its expected cumulative observability, while O aims
to maximize this same quantity. Our model is continuous in
time and space, relying on numerical methods for partial
differential equations (PDEs) to plan E’s trajectories via
dynamic programming. We also use techniques from multi-
objective and convex optimization to find Nash equilibrium
policies for both players.
Classical SE games were introduced in the 1970s and
assumed that each player is fully aware of the opponent’s
state and can react to any changes in real time [2], [3].
In contrast, our version of the game is built on a different
information structure, as each player makes their decisions
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based only on the probabilistic policy chosen by its oppo-
nent, rather than on that opponent’s actual current state. In
this sense, we are looking for optimal open loop controls,
with a built-in uncertainty of the opponent’s position. This
information structure arises in applications where logistical
considerations force the players to commit to strategies in
advance.
This version of SE games was recently considered in [1]
for a model that was rather simplified from the robotics point
of view: it lacked any detailed kinematics for E, allowed a
set of stationary locations (rather than general surveillance
plans) for O, and used the pointwise observability based
on omnidirectional sensors at O’s location(s). Here we use
the same algorithms for finding Nash equilibrium policies,
but extend the approach introduced in [1] to more realistic
settings. While we still use a simplified/isotropic model
for E’s dynamics, our observer might be non-stationary
(choosing among patrol trajectories) and our sensor might
be only effective in an angular sector relative to O’s current
heading.
In Section II, we review a PDE approach to E’s determinis-
tic trajectory-planning, assuming the pointwise observability
is fixed or predetermined. Section III describes the model and
algorithms for SE games, taking adversarial planning into
account. Section IV focuses on numerical methods, while
Section V examines the Nash equilibrium policies for several
test problems. The limitations of our approach and directions
for future work are discussed in Section VI.
II. EVASIVE PATH-PLANNING
We begin by considering a standard optimal control prob-
lem for the Evader under the assumption that the pointwise
observability is fixed and fully known.
E starts at some position x ∈ Ω at the time t, moves with a
location-dependent speed f(x) > 0, and can instantaneously
change its direction of motion. Its dynamics are given by:
y′(s) = f
(
y(s)
)
a(s), y(t) = x, (1)
where a : R → S1 is a measurable control function –
E’s chosen (time-dependent) direction of motion. Its path
is constrained to stay within Ω ⊂ R2 (e.g., avoiding any
obstacles), and must reach the target xT by the time T .
Suppose that the pointwise observability function K(x, s)
is given (i.e., the observer’s strategy is fixed). Let Ta =
min{s ≥ 0 | y(s) = xT} be the time it takes the Evader to
reach its target using control a(·). E’s goal is to minimize
its cumulative observability:
J (x, t,a(·)) =
{∫ Ta
t
K(y(s), s)ds, Ta ≤ T
+∞, otherwise (2)
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The value function u(x, t) is then defined by
u(x, t) = inf
a(·)
J (x, t,a(·)). (3)
Standard arguments in optimal control theory (e.g., [4,
Chapters 3,4]) show that u is the domain-constrained viscos-
ity solution of a time-dependent Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman
(HJB) equation:
∂u
∂t
+ min
|a|=1
{f(x)∇u(x, t) · a +K(x, t)} = 0;
u (x, T ) = +∞, ∀x 6= xT;
u (xT, t) = 0, ∀t ≤ T.
(4)
with an additional condition at ∂Ω\{xT } that the minimum
is taken over the subset of control values that ensure staying
inside Ω. Wherever the value function u is smooth, the
optimal direction of motion is a∗ = −∇u/|∇u| and the
above equation simplifies to a time-dependent Eikonal PDE
∂u
∂t
− f(x) |∇u(x, t)|+K(x, t) = 0. (5)
In general, (5) often does not have a classical solution,
but always has a unique viscosity solution, coinciding with
the value function of the optimal control problem [4]. The
optimal direction of motion a∗ is then uniquely determined
almost everywhere on a set {(x, t) |u(x, t) < +∞} since
u is Lipschitz and thus differentiable except on a set of
measure zero. However, for those rare starting positions
where ∇u is discontinuous, the optimal trajectory is not
unique: there can be multiple optimal initial directions a∗,
each of them producing a different optimal trajectory to xT.
The numerical methods for solving this PDE and tracing the
optimal trajectories will be covered in section IV.
Fig. 1. LEFT: Visibility field (yellow) for 3 different Observer positions
along a patrol trajectory (gray) in a domain with an occluding obstacle
(white). RIGHT: The contour plot of the pointwise observability K(x, t1),
corresponding to O’s position z(t1).
Before switching to a game-theoretic version of the prob-
lem, we remark on the definition of pointwise observability
K. Given O’s current position z(t), one can define its
visibility field V(t) restricted by obstacles and distance/angle
limitations of the sensor. Throughout this paper, we assume
that all obstacles are fully occluding and the sensors are
only effective in an angular sector of width α centered
on observer’s current heading h(t). I.e., x ∈ V(t) if the
line segment (z(t),x) stays in Ω without intersecting any
obstacles and the observation angle (i.e., the angle that
(z(t),x) makes with h(t)) is at most α/2. Within V(t),
the pointwise observability should be a decreasing function
of the distance |x− z(t)|. Assuming z(t) is known, we use
K(x, t) =
{
K0
|x−z(t)|2+0.1 + σ, x ∈ V(t);
σ, x 6∈ V(t); (6)
where K0 and σ are positive constants. This sector-restricted
observability is illustrated in Fig. 1.
III. SURVEILLANCE-EVASION GAMES
Here we describe the zero-sum game between O and
E, following the general framework developed in [1]. We
assume that
• O can use any patrol trajectory from the set Z =
{z1(t), ...zr(t)} known to both players;
• E can use any of the infinitely many admissible tra-
jectories that lead from xS to xT by the time T while
staying in Ω and avoiding the obstacles.
The payoff of our game is the (expected) cumulative ob-
servability, with E as a minimizer and O as a maximizer.
Both players are assumed to make their decisions ahead of
time and cannot change their mind based on any information
gained while traveling through Ω.
A. The “Evader-goes-second” problem
If O chooses the i-th patrol path, we can simply use zi
instead of z in (6) to define the corresponding pointwise
observability Ki, cumulative observability Ji, and value
function ui. The value of ui(xS, 0) yields the cumulative
observability along the zi-optimal trajectory (i.e., E’s best
response to O’s choice of zi.) In Fig. 2 we show two circular
patrol trajectories (traversed by O with the same angular
velocity) and E’s optimal trajectory in response to each of
them. If O were forced to make its decision deterministically
before E, it would simply choose whichever zi yields the
highest ui(xS, 0).
Fig. 2. E’s optimal responses (shown in green and orange) corresponding
to O’s respective patrol trajectories. The sensor is omnidirectional (i.e.,
α = 2pi). The pointwise observability is time-dependent, and we show
the contour plots for its initial version (i.e., Ki(x, 0)) in both cases.
If O prefers to use a probability distribution λ =
(λ1, . . . , λr) over the set Z instead of choosing a specific zi,
we can similarly define the expected pointwise observability
Kλ =
∑r
i=1 λiKi and the corresponding expected cumula-
tive observability J λ =
r∑
i=1
λiJi. To find E’s best response,
the corresponding value function uλ can be computed by
solving (5) with Kλ used in place of K. We note that uλ is
not a linear combination of ui’s since this PDE is nonlinear.
This approach is also related to methods for multi-
objective optimal control. It is generally impossible to min-
imize the observability with respect to all patrol trajecto-
ries simultaneously. Instead, one can consider the task of
finding Pareto-optimal controls. A control a˜(·) dominates
a(·) if Ji (xS, 0, a˜(·)) ≤ Ji (xS, 0,a(·)) for all i, with
the inequality strict for at least one i. We will say that
a(·) is Pareto-optimal if it is not dominated by any other
control. Plotting the point (J1, . . . ,Jr) for each Pareto-
optimal control we obtain a Pareto Front (PF), illustrated
in Fig. 3 for two examples from section V. Each vector λ
is normal to a support hyperplane of PF (on which J λ =
uλ(xS, 0)). If all the elements of λ are positive, it is easy
to show that any λ-optimal control is also Pareto-optimal.
This is the basis of a weighted-sum scalarization approach
to general multi-objective trajectory planning introduced in
[5]. Unfortunately, it approximates only convex parts of PF
[6]. Moreover, it requires imposing a fine grid on the space
of λ’s and solving the PDE for each λ-gridpoint. Alternative
methods can recover the entire PF [7], [8], but are more
computationally expensive. Luckily, for SE games we only
need the points on PF corresponding to the players’ mutually
optimal policies; below we explain how this can be done
through scalarization with a much smaller number of PDE
solves.
(A) (B)
Fig. 3. The convex part of Pareto Fronts (PFs) corresponding to two
examples from section V. PF approximations generated by using 101 λ
values, solving for uλ, and computing (J1,J2) for λ-optimal trajectories.
The dashed line shows a support hyperplane to PF, with n showing a scaled
version of λ∗. Evader’s optimal policy (shown in magenta) corresponds to
the intersection of that hyperplane with a “central ray” J1 = J2.
LEFT: Example 1 has only one λ∗-optimal trajectory and E’s optimal policy
is deterministic; see Fig. 5. J1-optimal and J2-optimal trajectories are also
represented on PF by the green and orange markers respectively.
RIGHT: In Example 2, E’s optimal policy assigns non-zero probabilities to
both λ∗-optimal trajectories (cyan and yellow); see Fig. 6.
O’s goal is to find a λ maximizing
G(λ) = min
a(·)
r∑
i=1
λiJi (xS, 0,a(·)) = uλ(xS, 0).
Since G is a pointwise minimum of functions linear in λ, we
know that G(λ) is concave. Thus, O’s optimal pdf λ∗ can
be found by standard methods of convex optimization. Our
implementation relies on the projected supergradient ascent
method [9, Chap. 8] to maximize G on the r-dimensional
simplex of probability densities. During the iterative im-
provement of λ, we use gradient descent in uλ starting
from (xS, 0) to find E’s λ-optimal trajectory. Integrating each
of Ki’s along that trajectory we obtain the supergradient
of G(λ), which is then used to update the λ for the next
iteration. See Algorithm 4.2 in [1].
B. Nash Equilibria
It is restrictive to assume that E is always reacting to O’s
decisions. To get a more general interpretation of the game’s
value, we need to search for a Nash equilibrium. E can also
define its policy probabilistically, by choosing a probability
distribution θ over the infinite set of admissible controls.
Given the players’ policies, the expected payoff is
P (λ, θ)=Eλ,θ
[
J (xS, 0,a(·))
]
=
r∑
i=1
λiEθ
[
Ji(xS, 0,a(·))
]
,
where a(·) is a random admissible control chosen according
to θ. A pair of policies (λ∗, θ∗) forms a Nash equilibrium if
neither player can improve the payoff by changing its policy
unilaterally. I.e.,
P (λ, θ∗) ≤ P (λ∗, θ∗) ≤ P (λ∗, θ), ∀λ, θ.
There always exists at least one Nash equilibrium in the set
of mixed/probabilistic policies. Moreover, in zero-sum two-
player games, the payoff is the same for all Nash equilibria
and is thus used to define the game’s value; e.g., see [10].
Thus, when each player uses a Nash policy, it no longer
matters which of them “goes first.”
By the min-max theorem, the value of this game can be
found by computing
P (λ∗, θ∗) = min
θ
max
λ
P (λ, θ) = max
λ
min
θ
P (λ, θ). (7)
In finite games, this is typically accomplished by linear
programming [10], but since E has infinitely many possible
paths, our game is semi-infinite [11], [12] and this approach is
inapplicable. Luckily, it is easy to see that the last expression
in (7) is equal to maxλG(λ) and the previous subsection
explains how to find the maximizer λ∗ efficiently.
Once the algorithm converges to O’s optimal λ∗, we need
to find the second half of the Nash equilibrium: E’s optimal
probability distribution θ∗ over the set of admissible trajec-
tories. We accomplish this using the following properties,
proven for a stationary Observer in [1], which similarly
hold for the time-dependent case considered here. Suppose
(λ∗, θ∗) is a Nash equilibrium, I = {i|λ∗,i > 0}, and A is
the set of all controls that have positive probability under θ∗.
1) If λ∗ maximizes G(λ), then there always exists a prob-
ability distribution θ∗ over Evader’s Pareto-optimal
trajectories such that (λ∗, θ∗) is a Nash equilibrium
and the set A has at most |I| ≤ r elements.
2) If a(·) ∈ A then a(·) is λ∗-optimal.
I.e.,
r∑
i=1
λiJi (xS, 0,a(·)) = uλ∗(xS, 0).
3) If i ∈ I, then Eθ∗ [Ji (xS, 0,a(·))] = uλ∗(xS, 0).
For all starting positions where uλ∗ is differentiable, the
optimal direction of motion is −∇uλ∗/|∇uλ∗ | and the
optimal control is unique. Thus, it is natural to expect that,
generically, there should be only one λ∗-optimal control
a∗(·) leading from xS to xT by the deadline T . This
would imply that A = {a∗(·)}; i.e., E’s half of the Nash
Equilibrium is pure/deterministic and Ji (xS, 0,a∗(·)) =
G(λ∗) = uλ∗(xS, 0) for all i ∈ I. (We say that a∗(·) is
the intersection of the Pareto Front and the “central ray” in
the |I|-dimensional cost space.) This situation, illustrated in
Fig. 3(A) is indeed quite common. But surprisingly, it is not
generic; i.e., for many problems A must include more than
one λ∗-optimal control. This is a counter-intuitive side-effect
of changing λ to maximize G: Kλ keeps changing until
(xS, 0) falls onto a “shockline”, a set of discontinuities of
∇uλ∗ . A numerically implemented gradient descent in uλ∗
usually yields only one λ∗-optimal trajectory. Approximating
all of them is much harder. We accomplish this by perturbing
λ∗ in various directions and computing the resulting unique
optimal trajectories corresponding to the perturbed (λ∗+δλ).
We refer readers to Alg. 4.3 in [1] for a detailed discussion.
IV. NUMERICAL IMPLEMENTATION
A. Numerics for HJB equation
We numerically solve (5) using a time-explicit first-order
upwind finite-difference scheme on a 9-point stencil. Let
xi,j = (ih, jh), tk = k∆t, and Uki,j ≈ u (xi,j , tk). We
will solve the equation backwards in time, computing Uk−1i,j
using the values of U at time slice k. More specifically, we
will compute an update from each of the eight triangular
simplices generated by xi,j and its eight nearest neighbors
(see Fig. 4).
(i,j+1) (i+1,j+1)
(i+1,j)
(i+1,j-1)(i,j-1)(i-1,j-1)
(i-1,j)
(i-1,j+1)
2
1
8
76
5
4
3
Fig. 4. Nine-point stencil used to discretize HJB equation at (xi,j , tk).
We first compute the first-order approximation (Ux, Uy) ≈
∇u(xi,j , tk) based on a specific simplex. We then check the
upwinding condition, requiring the approximate gradient to
point from that same simplex. E.g., for simplex 1
Ux =
Uki+1,j − Uki,j
h
, Uy =
Uki+1,j+1 − Uki+1,j
h
,
and the corresponding upwinding condition is Ux ≤ Uy ≤ 0.
Focusing on a single simplex l ∈ {1, ..., 8} with vertices
xi,j ,x
l,1, and xl,2, the update from that simplex is
Ul = U
k
i,j −∆tf(xi,j)Dki,j + ∆tK(xi,j , tk),
where Dki,j approximates |∇u(xi,j , tk)|. If the upwinding
condition is satisfied, we use Dki,j =
√
U2x + U
2
y . Otherwise,
we resort to a “one-sided” semi-Lagrangian update, with
Dki,j = max
(
Uki,j − U(xl,1, tk)
|xi,j − xl,1| ,
Uki,j − U(xl,2, tk)
|xi,j − xl,2| , 0
)
.
We then set Uk−1i,j to be the smallest of simplex-specific
updates {Ul}. The boundary conditions and terminal condi-
tions are enforced by setting
Uki,j =
{
0, xi,j = xT and tk ≤ T ;
+∞, xi,j 6∈ Ω or (xi,j 6= xT and tk = T ).
As long as the CFL stability condition ∆t ≤
h/(max f(xi,j)) is satisfied, this method is monotone and
consistent [13], and therefore converges to the viscosity
solution of (5) under grid refinement [14].
B. Time-dependent Visibility
Our definition of Vi(t) requires computing the set of points
that have direct line of sight from zi(t). Computational
efficiency is very important as this needs to be computed
for every time slice. Following [15], we first construct a
continuous function φ(x) such that
φ(x)

> 0, x ∈ Ω,
= 0, x ∈ ∂Ω,
< 0, x ∈ R2 \ Ω (e.g., inside obstacles).
Within each time slice t, we numerically solve the quasi-
variational inequality
max{∇ψt(x) · r(x), ψt(x)− φ(x)} = 0,
ψt(z(t)) = φ(z(t)),
where r(x) is a unit vector pointing from z(t) to x.
Then {ψt ≥ 0} will define the set of points that are not
occluded by obstacles. After computing ψt, we then enforce
any additional distance or angular restrictions to get Vi(t).
Combined with (6), this allows us to pre-compute and store
Ki(x, t) for each patrol trajectory zi(t) before starting to
plan E’s optimal responses to various Observer policies λ.
C. Time-dependent Optimal Path Tracer
Given our numerical solution Uki,j , we now wish to recover
the Evader’s optimal trajectory y(t). We approximate the
trajectory with a series of points ym ≈ y(m∆t), where ∆t
is the timestep used to numerically solve (5).
E’s initial position is y0 = y(0) = xS. The rest of the path
can be found in a semi-Lagrangian manner by computing
am∗ = arg min
|a|≤1
{
U˜ (ym + ∆tf(ym)a, m∆t)
}
,
ym+1 = ym + ∆tam∗ .
where U˜ is the function obtained from the grid values of U
by trilinear interpolation. We terminate the path once we get
close enough to the target so that |ym − xT| ≤ f(ym)∆t.
In our numerical experiments, we optimize over {|a| = 1}∪
{(0, 0)} instead of the entire unit disk {|a| ≤ 1}.
V. NUMERICAL EXPERIMENTS
In all of our examples1, we assume that the domain
is a unit square, sometimes containing impenetrable and
occluding obstacles. This square is discretized on a 201×201
grid (h = 0.005). E’s speed is uniform (f(x) = 1) and the
timestep is chosen according to the CFL stability condition:
∆t = h. Our examples use observability functions Ki(x, t)
of the form found in (6), with K0 = 1 and σ = 0.1. In
all examples, the Evader’s deadline for reaching the target
is T = 4, but all Nash equilibrium controls lead to a much
earlier arrival. (In our setting, the cumulative observability
is computed up to the arrival time Ta only.)
Example 1: No obstacles, two patrol trajectories, and
omnidirectional sensors (i.e., α = 2pi). Observer uses the
same angular speed and moves counterclockwise on both
patrol trajectories, which were already introduced in Fig. 2.
Nash equilibrium policies are shown in Fig. 5. See also the
Pareto Front in Fig. 3(A).
Example 2: One obstacle, with the same sensors and
patrol trajectories as Example 1. Nash equilibrium policies
are shown in Fig. 6. Evader’s optimal policy is probabilistic,
relying on two λ∗-optimal trajectories that pass above and
below the obstacle. See also the Pareto Front in Fig. 3(B).
Example 3: Three obstacles, two patrol trajectories with
direction-restricted sensors (α = 2pi/3). The patrol trajec-
tories each follow a figure-eight pattern. Nash equilibrium
policies are shown in Fig. 7.
Example 4: Many obstacles, with 4 patrol trajectories on
the same circle, but at different phases. Observer’s angular
speed is ω = 1/2pi, and with direction-restricted sensors (i.e.,
α = 2pi/3). Nash equilibrium policies are shown in Fig. 8.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have developed and tested a numerical method for SE
games under uncertainty with isotropic Evader dynamics,
a time-dependent Observer, and a direction-limited sensor.
The efficiency of our approach stems from combining ex-
isting techniques from game theory, convex optimization,
and dynamic programming in continuous state/time. The lat-
ter requires efficient numerical methods for time-dependent
Eikonal PDEs. Incorporating more realistic models of Evader
dynamics will require solving more general Hamilton-Jacobi
PDEs. While our current implementation relies on an ex-
plicit first-order upwind scheme, the use of higher-order
accurate discretizations [13], [16] would be desirable in the
future. Additional speed improvements might be also attained
through a time-dependent version of causal domain restric-
tion [17]. All numerical examples presented above assumed
that the Observer is a robotic platform with the direction
1 Movies for all of these examples can be found at https://
eikonal-equation.github.io/TimeDependent_SEG.
of sensor/camera fixed relative to the Observer’s heading.
However, the same methods would work almost without
change for panning/tilting cameras, Observers with multiple
sensors, and more sophisticated observability models in the
Observer’s field of view [18]. It is also relatively easy to
extend the approach to a centralized planner controlling
several Evaders, but if all of them have separate targets, the
cost of each iteration will increase accordingly. For a large
group of Evaders, one will need to rely on distributed optimal
control techniques or on Mean Field Game models, if these
Evaders engage in selfish/independent trajectory planning.
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Fig. 5. Four snapshots of the Nash Equilibrium solution for Example 1. Observer’s optimal policy is λ∗ = (0.67, 0.33). Observer’s patrol trajectories (in
gray) and Evader’s unique λ∗-optimal trajectory (magenta) shown on top of the contour plots of Kλ∗ (x, t). Observer’s possible position on each patrol
trajectory is shown by a black circle, with an arrow indicating Observer’s current heading. Evader’s starting, current, and terminal positions are shown by
a magenta diamond, a magenta circle, and a green triangle respectively.
Fig. 6. Four snapshots of the Nash Equilibrium solution for Example 2. Observer’s optimal policy is λ∗ = (0.48, 0.52), and Evader’s optimal policy is
θ∗ = (0.691, 0.309), with two different λ∗-optimal trajectories shown, one in yellow and one in blue corresponding to the yellow and blue points in Fig.
3B.
Fig. 7. Four snapshots of the Nash Equilibrium solution for Example 3. Observer’s optimal policy is λ∗ = (0.5, 0.5), and Evader’s optimal policy is
θ∗ = (0.5, 0.5), with two different λ∗-optimal trajectories shown in cyan and yellow.
Fig. 8. Four snapshots of the Nash Equilibrium solution for Example 4. Observer’s optimal policy is λ∗ = (0.077, 0.127, 0.452, 0.344), and Evader’s
optimal policy is θ∗ = (0.592, 0.084, 0.145, 0.180), with four different λ∗-optimal trajectories shown in cyan, yellow, magenta, and red.
